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Case Notes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST
AMENDMENT-CONTENT NEUTRALITY
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, petition for rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
When the city of Detroit restricted the location of movie theaters
solely on the basis of the content of their films, the owners of certain
"adult" theaters were surprised to discover that the first amendment
and Voltaire himself' offered them no protection. In Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc.2 the Supreme Court upheld the city's effort to
prevent a concentration of pornography creating a "skid row." Al-
though the practical impact of Supreme Court opinions is considered
negligible in some areas, 3 municipal land-use planners have been
quick to make use of the Court's decision in Young. Indianapolis, Los
Angeles, Des Moines, New York City, Portland (Oregon), Kansas
City (Missouri), and Fairfax County (Virginia), have all passed, or are
considering, laws similar to the Detroit zoning ordinance.4
The Anti-Skid Row Ordinance5 challenged by the respondents in
Young required, inter alia, that adult theaters be more than 1,000 feet
apart from other such theaters and other "regulated uses." 6 A theater
was "adult" if the content of the movies shown was "characterized by
an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to 'Specified
Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.' "7 These activities
1. "Referring to a suggestion that the violent overthrow of tyranny might be
legitimate,. .. [Voltaire remarked:] 'I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to
the death your right to say it.' "Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63,
petition for rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). See note 49 infra and accompanying
text.
2. 427 U.S. 50.
3. For example, the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in the criminal justice
area have been described as having the same effect upon the crime rate as "gamma
rays." L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW, THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (1974).
4. N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. I.
5. 427 U.S. at 54.
6. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.0100 (1962). The other uses,
listed in § 66.0000, include adult book stores, group "D" cabarets, any bar or restaurant
serving liquor, hotels or motels, pawnshops, pool halls, shoeshine parlors, secondhand
stores, and taxi dance halls. 427 U.S. at 52 n.3.
7. 427 U.S. at 53. DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCE 742-G (1972).
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and areas were set out in sufficient detail to make the city council
blush.8
The respondents asserted the invalidity of the ordinance upon three
grounds: first, that it was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; second, that it
constituted an impermissible prior restraint upon first amendment
expression; and third, that the classification of theaters solely by film
content violated the fourteenth amendment's mandate for equal protec-
tion of the laws. 9 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the city, 10 but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. 1
Judge Lively, for the Court of Appeals, relied on the third ground, and
required a compelling state interest to justify the city's content-based
classification-an interest which he found lacking. 2
Reversing the court of appeals, Justice Stevens wrote for a four
member plurality and purported to establish a lower standard of protec-
tion for "erotic materials" which would permit content distinctions as
the basis for regulation as long as the "record discloses a factual basis
for . . .[achieving] the desired effect.' ' 13 The fifth vote for reversal
was supplied by Justice Powell whose special concurrence did not
accept the plurality's view, but proceeded instead upon what might be
labeled a zoning theory. 14 Justice Powell reasoned that since the
city's intention was not to suppress expression, and since the infringe-
ment of free expression was only incidental, no special justification
was necessary for the content regulation imposed by the ordinance. All
four dissenters joined in the two dissenting opinions. Justice Stewart
answered the plurality by asserting that content distinctions were
8. The Court presented these items in a footnote:
"For the purposes of this Section, 'Specified Sexual Activities' is defined
as:
"1. Human Genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal;
"2. Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or sodomy;
"3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region,
buttock or female breast
"And 'Specified Anatomical Areas' is defined as:
"I. Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals, pubic
region, (b) buttock, and (c) female breast below a point immediately above the
top of the areola; and
"2. Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely
and opaquely covered."
427 U.S. at 53 n.4.
9. Id. at 58.
10. Nortown Theatre, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
I1. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 1019.
13. 427 U.S. at 71. Joining Justice Stevens' opinion were Justices Rehnquist and
White, and Chief Justice Burger. Justice Powell joined only parts I and II. Id. at 51.
14. Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
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simply not permissible under the first amendment, 15 and that the recent
decision in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville16 required affirmance. 7
Justice Blackmun's dissent further urged that the ordinance was fatally
vague, since a theater owner could not know whether his films were
sufficiently "characterized by an emphasis" on the activities and
anatomical areas described in the statute.18
A crucial aspect of the Young decision is that the speech covered
by the statute is admittedly not obscene,19 and is, therefore, protected
by the first amendment. Presented with a claimed violation of the first
amendment, a court must look to the content of the speech to deter-
mine whether it is protected by the first amendment. Once it is
established that the first amendment does protect the expression, a
state may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of the speech in order to further legitimate state interests. 20
However, the first amendment severely limits the ability of the state to
base those time, place, and manner restrictions solely on the content of
the protected speech. 21 This is the doctrine of content neutrality. If this
doctrine means that after the initial determination (to see if the expres-
sion is inside or outside the area protected by the first amendment) no
content distinctions can be made, then the Detroit ordinance regulating
theaters based on the content of their films appears to present a classic
instance of discriminatory treatment of protected expression, and the
Young decision, upholding the statute, is a "drastic departure from
established principles of first amendment law.'"22
This Note analyzes the reasoning used by both the plurality and
Justice Powell. Special emphasis is placed on the notion of content
neutrality in the regulation of first amendment expression-how it
developed, how it has been used by the Court, and how it should apply
to the facts of Young. Emphasis will also be placed on Justice Pow-
ell's zoning theory and its implications for future conflicts between
land-use regulations and assertions of individual liberty.
II. THE DECISION
Parts I and II of Justice Stevens' opinion are the "majority"
opinion in Young, because Justice Powell joined in both of them while
15. Id. at 85-86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
16. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
17. 427 U.S. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 85 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
21. Id. See notes 86-122 infra and accompanying text.
22. 427 U.S. at 84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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not joining in Part Iff. Parts I and II dealt with the respondents' first
two challenges, vagueness and prior restraint.23
The vagueness argument was treated first. Justice Stevens found no
need to consider the "abstract" validity of this claim since, even if
vague as to some, the ordinance was "unquestionably applicable to
these respondents." 24 Therefore, he concluded, the respondents had
no standing to assert vagueness.
In the past, however, because of the potential chilling of first
amendment expression by an overly broad regulatory ordinance, the
Court has allowed a party clearly covered by an ordinance to assert its
infirmity on behalf of others. 25 To invoke what Justice Stevens calls
"[tihis exception from traditional rules of standing,''26 the plaintiff
must show a deterrent effect that is "both real and substantial" upon
"legitimate expression,"27 and that the statute is not" 'readily subject
to a narrowing construction by the state courts.' "28 Justice Stevens
found no "real and substantial" deterrence, not because there was no
chilling effect, but because the speech was "on the border line be-
tween pornography and artistic expression. ' ' 29 Therefore, there was a
"less vital interest" in protecting this speech and the deterrence of
legitimate expression was not significant. 30 Moreover, the majority
could "see no reason why the statute was not 'readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the state courts.' -31
The next basis of the respondents' argument, that the ordinance
was an invalid prior restraint on protected speech, was disposed of in
less than two pages. Leaving to one side the issue of content neutrality,
a city clearly has the power to impose" [r]easonable regulations of the
time, place, and manner of protected speech.''32 Within this power,
Detroit was able to require all theaters to be licensed, and even the
1,000 foot restriction, if applied to all theaters, would not "in itself,
create an impermissible restraint on protected communication." 33
Thus, the locational requirements would not invalidate the ordinance
unless it was invalid for regulating location solely on the basis of film
content.
23. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
24. 427 U.S. at 59.
25. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
26. 427 U.S. at 59-60.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
29. 427 U.S. at 61.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 63 n.18.
33. Id. at 62.
459
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Finally, Justice Stevens turned to the question of whether regula-
tions which distinguished theaters solely by the content of their films
were violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. This section of the opinion, which Justice Powell did not join,
began by quoting Voltaire: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it." 3 4 This remark characterizes
the high regard of American society and the Supreme Court for "the
principle that the government may not tell the citizen what he may or
may not say." '35 The opinion also acknowledged and cited broad
language in support of respondents' position that "above all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." 
36
Despite this language, Justice Stevens insisted that the "actual
adjudications" of the Court show that "the stated principle that there
may be no restriction whatever on expressive activity because of its
content" 37 is not absolute. First of all, the determination whether a
given expression is to receive the protection of the first amendment at
all requires an examination of the content of that expression. Thus, the
plurality recognized that speech involving incitation to crime, 38 incita-
tion to violence by "fighting words, 39 and publication in time of war
of "the number and location of troops"" is not protected by the first
amendment.
Secondly, "[e]ven within the area of protected speech, a differ-
ence in content may require a different governmental response." 41 As
examples, the plurality noted that content distinctions are permissible
in cases involving libel, 42 commercial speech, 43 political advertising
34. Id. at 63.
35. Id.
36. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
37. 427 U.S. at 65-66.
38. E.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1966).
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
40. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
41. 427 U.S. at 65-66 (emphasis added):
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The requirements for
newspaper libel differ according to the content of the defamatory statement, such as
whether the subject was a public official. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974). See generally Collins & Drushal, The Reaction of State Courts to Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 306 (1978).
43. Justice Stevens asserted, despite the recent decision of Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (purporting to put
to rest the notion that commercial speech could be less protected than other speech), that
not all advertisements would be protected, and the determination regarding protection
would depend upon content.
[Vol. 28:456
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on a public rapid transit system,44 statements by employers to their
employees, 45 and, "[m]ore directly in point,"46 erotic materials of an
obscene nature when distributed to juveniles. 47
Justice Stevens next turned to whether such content regulation
could be imposed upon American Mini Theatres and its co-respon-
dents: 48
• ..even though we recognize that the First Amendment
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that
have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that soci-
ety's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immor-
tal comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical dis-
cussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every
schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right
to speak remains the same. But few of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right
to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters
of our choice. 49
Having established this less rigorous standard of protection for erotic
speech, Justice Stevens went on to agree with the district court that
"[t]he record discloses a factual basis for the Common Council's
conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect,"50
and thus the challenged zoning ordinance "does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." '51
While the issue of content neutrality in the regulation of protected
speech was the principal question presented by Young (and the focus
of both Justice Stevens' opinion and Justice Stewart's dissent), Justice
Powell contributed a theory "sufficiently different' 52 to allow him to
reach the same result without joining in Part I of the plurality
opinion. The ordinance must be upheld, he stated, since it is no more
than an "innovative land-use regulation, implicating First Amendment
concerns only incidentally and to a limited extent." 53
In a footnote, Justice Powell declared that it was unnecessary to
44. E.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
45. E.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
46. 427 U.S. at 69.
47. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
48. Co-respondents with American Mini Theatres, Inc., were Pussy Cat Theatres of
Michigan, Inc. and Nortown Theatre, Inc.
49. 427 U.S. at 70.
50. Id. at 71.
51. Id. at 72-73.
52. Id. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id.
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decide whether distinctions based on content are permissible for erotic,
though nonobscene, materials. He added, however, that he is not
"inclined to agree with . . . the holding in Part III (and supporting
discussion)." '54 After summarizing some of the Court's decisions
broadly sustaining zoning ordinances as "an accepted necessity in our
increasingly urbanized society,'"'" Justice Powell asserted that the
question before the Court in Young was a "unique situation . . .
[which] calls, as cases in this area so often do, for a careful inquiry into
the competing concerns of the State and the interest protected by the
guarantee of free expression." 56
In pursuing that inquiry, Justice Powell employed the four-part test
developed by the Court in United States v. O'Briens7 to determine the
validity of governmental regulations which, in regulating non-
communicative conduct, incidentally regulate communicative
conduct. Such a law will be upheld, despite the incidental infringement
on first amendment rights,
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on...
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.5 8
Although Justice Powell noted that there are "factual distinctions
between a prosecution for destruction of a Selective Service registra-
tion certificate, as in O'Brien, and this case," 59 he applied the test
because "the essential weighing and balancing of competing interests
are the same."6°
Under the O'Brien standard the restriction on speech must be
"incidental" and not direct. "The primary concern of the free speech
guarantee . . . is that there be a free flow from creator to audience of
whatever message a film or a book might convey." 61 Thus, if the
Detroit ordinance did not restrict the film makers in terms of content,
nor affect their ability to make the films publicly available, and if the
ordinance did not restrict "in any significant way" the ability of the
public to view those films, then the infringement on first amendment
54. Id. n.1.
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id. at 76.
57. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
58. 427 U.S. at 79-80 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))
(Powell, J., concurring).
59. 427 U.S. at 80 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 76-77.
462 [Vol. 28:456
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liberty was incidental. 62 Justice Powell found that none of these restric-
tions were significant in Young; therefore the free flow of protected
speech was only incidentally impaired. Next, Justice Powell found that
the zoning ordinance was undoubtedly within the power of the city of
Detroit, and that the city's interest in the stability of its neighborhoods
was "both important and substantial." 63 The purpose of the restriction
was not to "suppress" these films but to prevent a deleterious effect on
the neighborhood. "Nor is there reason to question that the degree of
incidental encroachment upon such expression was the minimum nec-
essary to further the purpose of the ordinance. "64 The four parts of the
test, therefore, were satisfied by the Detroit zoning plan.
In the fourth and final part of his concurring opinion, 65 Justice
Powell addressed the reliance of the dissenters upon the 1975 case of
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.66 Erznoznik involved an ordinance
which banned the showing of films containing nudity by drive-in
theaters whose screens were visible from the street. The Court struck
down the Jacksonville ordinance, but Justice Powell, who authored the
majority opinion in Erznoznik, distinguished it from the facts in
Young by pointing out that the Jacksonville ordinance purported to
prevent a nuisance-it was not a zoning ordinance.67 The Jacksonville
ordinance was found to be overly broad because it prohibited "the
showing of any nudity, however innocent or educational.''68 The
ordinance struck down in Erznoznik "was a misconceived attempt
directly to regulate content of expression;" 69 unlike the Detroit ordi-
nance, it was not an incidental restriction.
Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun in a dissenting opinion which characterized the majority
decision as "an aberration.''70 The dissenters stated flatly that the
doctrine of content neutrality required invalidation of the ordinance:
"By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides
roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law, which
require that time, place and manner regulations that affect protected
expression be content-neutral except in the limited context of a captive
62. Id.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Id. at 81-82.
65. This part of the opinion is erroneously labelled "III" in the unbound Official
Reporter. Id. at 83.
66. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
67. 427 U.S. at 83 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 84.
70. Id. at 87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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or juvenile audience.''71 The opinion also rejected Justice Stevens'
"marching our sons and daughters off to war" standard of protection,
arguing that it was precisely because few of us would go to war to
protect the speech regulated by the ordinance that the speech should
have the "full protection of the Constitution.' '72
All the dissenters joined in a second dissenting opinion written by
Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun criticized the plurality's refusal to
grant the petitioners' standing to urge that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutionally vague on its face.73 He maintained that the Detroit ordi-
nance was fatally vague because the regulated speech was cryptically
defined as films whose content is "characterized by an emphasis" on
particular anatomical areas or activities.74 Furthermore, to determine if
he complied with the ordinance, a theater operator had to ascertain
whether there were two other regulated uses within 1,000 feet of his
operation. 75 Justice Blackmun also contended that other elements of
the ordinance-the broad discretion vested in the mayor concerning
the licensing of "adult" theaters, and the discretion vested in the
mayor and the City Planning Commission regarding waivers of the
ordinance-were unconstitutionally overbroad.
76
III. CONTENT NEUTRALITY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Development of the Doctrine
The central issue presented in Young is whether, and to what
extent, a state can regulate protected expression solely on the basis of
its content. The notion that regulations must be content neutral was
stated as virtually an absolute principle by Justice Stewart in his
dissent,77 while the four members of the plurality appear to accept
without question the propriety of content distinctions. A look at the
development of this principle is helpful in deciding whether this rule is
as rigid and absolute, or as flexible and qualified, as the two sides
claim.
As with many rigid rules of first amendment law, the concept of
content neutrality was first appreciated and articulated by Justice
Black, well known for his unusual belief that the first amendment's
71. Id. at 85-86.
72. Id. at 86.
73. Id. at 94-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 89.
75. Id. at 89-90.
76. Id. at 91-92.
77. Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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phrase "no law" 78 meant "no law." 79 One of Justice Black's early
opinions reflecting this theme dealt with the permissibility of certain
picketing under the National Labor Relations Act. 0 Congress had
included a provision in the Act which was interpreted by Justice Black
to forbid picketing "only when the picketers express particular
views." For Justice Black, such a distinction based upon the content of
the message necessarily violated the first amendment. 81 When the
Court upheld city ordinances prohibiting demonstrations on public
streets, Justice Black reconciled this with his absolute position on free
speech, stating that the ordinances were intended to regulate conduct,
and that the infringement on free expression was merely incidental;
moreover, the burden was on the municipality to show that the reasons
behind the ordinances "outweighed" the incidental infringement of
first amendment rights. 82 He insisted, however, that even such inci-
dental infringements could not discriminate on the basis of content:
"[T]hose cases never intimated that we would uphold as constitutional
an ordinance which purported to rest upon the power of a city to
regulate traffic but which was aimed at speech or attempted to regulate
the content of speech." 8 3
Justice Black wrote for the Court in Adderly v. Florida," uphold-
ing the state's denial of a particular location for a civil rights protest,
since there was
not a shred of evidence in this record that this power was
exercised . ..because the sheriff objected to what was
being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disa-
greed with the objectives of their protest. The record reveals
that he objected only to their presence on that part of the jail
grounds for any purpose. . . .The United States Constitu-
78. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967) (Black, J., concurring); Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting).
80. NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76, 79 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring) (construing 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970)).
81. Id. Dissenting from a 1961 decision which held that the California Board of Bar
Examiners could constitutionally deny admission to an applicant who had refused to
answer questions regarding his previous involvement with the Communist Party, Justice
Black rejected the proposition that the first amendment right could be balanced against
competing interests: "I believe that the First Amendment's unequivocal command that
there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the
men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this
field." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
82. 366 U.S. at 69 (Black, J., dissenting).
83. Id. Justice Black was referring to "Schneider v. State; Cox v. New Hampshire;
Prince v. Massachusetts; and Kovacs v. Cooper." Id. at 69 n.27 (citations omitted).
84. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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tion does not forbid a State to control the use of its own
property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory [content
neutral] purpose.85
The landmark decision for the principle of content neutrality was
handed down after Justice Black had left the Court. It was Justice
Marshall's opinion in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley16
which introduced the famous language quoted by Justice Stevens in
Young that "the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.' '87 In Mosley, a lone and admittedly
peaceful picketer patrolled the public sidewalk adjoining a Chicago
high school carrying a sign which read: "Jones High School practices
black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota.''88 The
Chicago ordinance challenged by Mosley proscribed all picketing of
schools except for peaceful picketing during a labor dispute, an ordi-
nance clearly not content neutral. Justice Marshall's opinion held the
Chicago ordinance unconstitutional because it restricted speech on the
basis of content. 89 However, in contrast to Justice Black's unequivocal
statements in Adderly, Justice Marshall qualified his application of the
neutrality requirement by acknowledging that the state could legiti-
mately prohibit picketing, in appropriate circumstances, in order "to
protect public order. But these justifications for selective exclusions
from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized.' '9 The equal
protection analysis of the six-member majority in Mosley subjected
the Chicago ordinance to the rigorous test of strict scrutiny91-a test it
failed to pass. Though the interest of the city was substantial, the
classification was not sufficiently tailored to that interest, and could
not be supported merely by an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance.'"92
85. Id. at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
86. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
87. Id. at 95.
88. Id. at 93.
89. Id. at 99-102.
90. Id. at 98-99.
91. The majority stated that "we analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 408 U.S. at 94-95, and found that the
equal protection and the first amendment interests were "closely intertwined." Id. at 95.
Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result without opinion. Chief
Justice Burger concurred in a one-paragraph opinion noting that the government could
still censor speech in the familiar, unprotected areas of obscenity, Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957); "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942); and libel, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). None of the
concurring Justices took exception to the strict scrutiny standard applied by the ma-
jority.
92. 408 U.S. at 101 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503,508
(1969)).
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Mosley was hailed by Professor Karst as a "landmark first amend-
ment decision [in which the] Court has explicitly adopted the principle
of equal liberty of expression. " 93 Professor Karst did not ignore the
qualification of the principle in Mosley; he recognized that although
"absolute equality is a practical impossibility [t]he principle requires
courts to start from the assumption that all speakers and all points of
view are entitled to a hearing, and permits deviation from this basic
assumption only upon a showing of substantial necessity." ' 94 Thus,
Mosley, the case most often cited for the requirement of content
neutrality, 95 did not create an absolute ban on content distinctions, but
rather raised a presumption against their validity by requiring them to
survive a strict scrutiny analysis.
One of the chief cases employing the equal liberty standard ar-
ticulated in Mosley was the case relied upon by the Young dissent-
ers-Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.96 The appellant in Erznoznik,
the manager of a drive-in theater, challenged a Jacksonville, Florida
ordinance which prohibited the showing of any movie containing
nudity97 by outdoor or drive-in theaters with screens "visible from any
public street or public place." 9 8 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of
the Court, which struck down the statute as invalid on its face. 99
In considering the justification for the statute proffered by the city,
that the ordinance was intended to eliminate a nuisance,100 Justice
Powell, citing Mosley, explained that "when the government, acting
as a censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others,
the First Amendment strictly limits its power." 10 1 The city had reg-
ulated nonobscene speech solely on the basis of content and had
created a restraint on free expression.102 As a result, the "limited
93. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REv. 20, 28 (1975).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 303,
311 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 129,
130 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16, 34 (1973).
96. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
97. The film contained "female buttocks and bare breasts." 422 U.S. at 206. The
particular movie involved was "Class of '74" which had been rated "R" by the Motion
Picture Association of America. Id. at 206 n. 1.
98. Id. at 207.
99. Id. at 215-217.
100. The city also justified the ordinance as protective of juveniles, and as a traffic
regulation. The Court found the total ban on nudity overinclusive as to the first justifica-
tion, id. at 212-14, and underinclusive as to the second. Id. at 214-15.
101. Id. at 209.
102. Id. at 211 n.8.
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privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this
censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its
content." ' 10 3 Although requiring more justification than the city sup-
plied, this somewhat obscure standard used in Erznoznik for justifying
content distinctions is apparently not as stringent as the strict scrutiny
standard of Mosley. Interestingly, this part of the Erznoznik opinion
does not mention the equal protection clause. Rather, in analyzing the
concerns of the first amendment, Justice Powell balanced the compet-
ing interests of the state and the individual-a technique of which he is
particularly enamored. 104
Although the standard of Erznoznik is less exacting than the stan-
dard used in Mosley, there still remains a presumption of invalidity
when content distinctions are made, and any ordinance making such
distinctions must "satisfy the rigorous constitutional standards that
apply when government attempts to regulate expression.""0 5 Even so,
a presumption of invalidity is not an absolute prohibition. Therefore,
Justice Stewart's insistence, in his Young dissent, that the regulation
must be content neutral would be difficult to understand were it not for
one other recent Supreme Court decision. On March 3, 1976, three
weeks prior to the oral argument in Young, the Court handed down its
decision in Hudgens v. NLRB. 106 The dispute in Hudgens arose when
labor picketers picketing the retail store of their employer were ejected
from a private shopping mall. Justice Stewart himself wrote for a
majority faced with the task of reconciling two ostensibly inconsistent
opinions dealing with the availability of first amendment rights in a
private shopping complex. 107
103. Id. at 212.
104. See Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of
Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1023-26, 1029-32 (1972).
105. 422 U.S. at 217. The Chief Justice's response in dissent was: "The First Amend-
ment interests involved in this case are trivial at best." Id. at 223 (Burger, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist joined in that opinion.
106. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
107. Although the first amendment, through the fourteenth amendment, prohibits
state infringement on free speech, the guarantee does not necessarily prevent infringe-
ment of free speech by private individuals. The first extension of first amendment rights
on private property came in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which all of the
property of Chickasaw, Alabama was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Company, includ-
ing the streets and street corners, sidewalks, parks, and similar public places. According
to the Court these places are "historically associated with the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights." Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315
(1968). In such circumstances, where the town was the functional equivalent of a state
municipality, denial of first amendment rights was impermissible state action under the
fourteenth amendment. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 918-23 (9th ed. 1975).
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In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. ,lO8 the
Court had held that a private shopping center could not, consistent with
the first amendment, prevent the picketing of one of its stores since the
private center was the functional equivalent of a public business
district.1°9 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,110 the Court rejected the first
amendment claim of young people barred from distributing anti-war
leaflets in a shopping mall. The Court distinguished Logan Valley
because the anti-war leaflets were not directly related to the activities
of a particular store within the mall. 1
Such a distinction, of course, depends upon the content of the
message to be conveyed. That, for Justice Stewart, was impermissible;
although Lloyd purported to distinguish Logan Valley based on the
content of the message, in fact "the ultimate holding in Lloyd
amounted to a total rejection of the holding in Logan Valley." 11 2
Criticizing the reasoning used in Lloyd to distinguish it from Logan
Valley, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Hudgens, stated that
while a municipality may constitutionally impose reasonable
time, place, and manner regulations on the use of its streets
and sidewalks for First Amendment purposes. . . and may
even forbid altogether such use of some of its facilities. ....
what a municipality may not do under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments is to discriminate in the regulation of
expression on the basis of the content of that expression
113
Justice Stewart concluded that since the first amendment did not
prohibit the ejection of anti-war demonstrators from a shopping center
in Lloyd, it should not prohibit the explusion of labor demonstrators
from a shopping center in Hudgens; the two situations could be distin-
guished only on the basis of the content of the demonstrators' expres-
sion which would be impermissible under the first amendment.
The balancing test Justice Powell used in Lloyd, taking into ac-
count the connection between the message and the businesses in the
shopping center, 114 was incompatible with Justice Stewart's absolute
108. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
109. Id. at 318.
110. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
111. Id. at 563. In Logan Valley, the Court noted it was not called upon to decide the
validity of picketing which was not directly related to activities on the property. 391 U.S.
at 320 n.9.
112. 424 U.S. at 518.
113. Id. at 520 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)) (empha-
sis in original).
114. Justice Powell balanced the first amendment interests of the protesters with the
private property interests of the mall owner. Because the message was totally unrelated
to the business activity of the shopping center, it was less important for the protest to
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view of the ban on content distinctions.1 15 Therefore, Justice Stewart's
dissent in Young is consistent with his majority opinion in Hudgens.
In contrast, despite the fact that Justice Powell's balancing test was
being overruled, he joined the majority opinion in Hudgens-not
simply in the result-as did two of the Young plurality, Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist.116
The dissenters in Hudgens, Justices Marshall and Brennan, were
willing to permit content distinctions by private property owners rather
than reject all first amendment claims, but still maintained the position
that the principle of content neutrality was "unquestionably applica-
ble" where "it was clearly the government that was acting." 117 Thus,
in March of 1976, seven Justices agreed that the government simply
could not regulate expression on the basis of its content.
Although the doctrine of content neutrality has had an unsettled
development, by the time Young v. American Mini Theatres came
before the Court, the principle was thought to require, if not absolute
neutrality, at least a substantial burden of justification upon the reg-
ulating government.' 18 The "presumptive unconstitutionality of
content discriminations" 119 was overcome in some cases, but the
Court considered them to be clearly defined exceptions to the general
rule. 120 In light of this precedent, the Court in Young could have
justifiably rejected Justice Stewart's absolute position, and, recogniz-
take place in the center, as opposed to nearby public streets and sidewalks. 407 U.S. at
564. It is noteworthy that Mosley and Lloyd were decided only four days apart; the
former forbade content distinctions in the public forum while the latter employed
content distinctions and balanced the interests in a private shopping center. "Lloyd
Corp. and Mosley. . . produce this extraordinary result: a labor-picketing exception in
an ordinance is unconstitutional, but in a 'private' shopping center a labor-picketing
exception is constitutionally required. The nation deserves better than this, and the first
amendment's equality principle demands better." Karst, supra note 93, at 41. Hudgens
appears to have resolved this problem by transforming Lloyd, from the balance it
purported to strike, to an outright overruling of Logan Valley.
115. Justice Stewart has elsewhere demonstrated an appreciation for an absolute and
inflexible rule in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 198 (1964) (concurring opinion) and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
(concurring opinion) (states may under no circumstances make the criminality of an act
depend on the color of the actor's skin).
116. Justice Stevens did not participate in Hudgens; Justice White concurred in the
result, 424 U.S. 507, 524 (1976).
117. Id. at 541.
118. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 324 (1970);
A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948);
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
119. Karst, Public Enterprise and the Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 255 (1976).
120. "Such selective restrictions [content distinctions] have been upheld only when
the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home. . . or the degree of captivity makes it
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ing the presumptive unconstitutionality of the Detroit ordinance, ap-
plied the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis of Mosley12 , or the
"rigorous" balancing of Erznoznik.122 However, Justice Stevens and
the plurality went much further.
B. Equal Protection, "Not to Mention
the First Amendment Itself"'
In Young, the Court stated that the respondents' position on the
question of content neutrality was "that the classification of theaters
on the basis of the content of their exhibitions violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 24 However, in
neither the plurality opinion of Justice Stevens nor the concurrence of
Justice Powell is there any express articulation of the "traditional"
equal protection analysis which perennially plagues law students.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 25 has, in
recent years, become the focus of a great deal of legal analysis and
debate. 126 Traditionally, the Court has evaluated legislative classifica-
tions, such as Detroit's classification of adult theaters, by examin-
ing the state goals or purposes behind the challenged statute. Where
the Court has found a legitimate state objective, the burden is on the
state to show that the classification is truly a means to the intended
result. In most instances, this burden is rather small; the Court requires
only that there be some "rational relation" between the means chosen
and its intended effect. 127 Stated in its most deferential form, "the
impractical for the unwillifig viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 209 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 729 (1970)
(where the speaker intruded on the privacy of the home), and Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (where the captive audience could not avoid unwilling
exposure)).
121. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
122. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
123. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
124. 427 U.S. at 58.
125. No state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
126. See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J.
1071 (1974); Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal
Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807 (1973).
127. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning ordinance
distinguishing between families and unrelated residents upheld as reasonable and ration-
ally related to a permissible state objective); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802 (1969) (legislative omission of unsentenced prisoners from absentee ballot
provisions held not violative of equal protection clause since classification bore rational
relationship to legitimate state end); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)
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constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. '' 128
In some instances, however, the legislative classification will be
viewed with "strict scrutiny," requiring a high degree of means-ends
congruence. 2 9 As Justice Powell once wrote, "when state statutory
classifications approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny." 3 ' The difficult issues which arise
from this branch of equal protection doctrine are first, what are sensi-
tive and fundamental personal rights, and second, what does strict
scrutiny entail.131
The rights traditionally protected by strict scrutiny are those which
maintain the integrity of the political process (through which a legisla-
ture's classifications might be changed), and those which protect
"insular minorities" from discrimination by the states. 132 Thus, rights
in "the area of economics and social welfare" have been excluded
from strict equal protection scrutiny, 133 while political and civil rights
have not. Notably, "[i]n the area of First Amendment liberties, the
modem Court has imposed very substantial restraints on state ac-
(legislation regulating optical industry held constitutional as rational means to legitimate
state goal).
128. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
129. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
130. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
131. The traditional "two tier" equal protection analysis is not a hard-and-fast rule of
law; it is a means of explaining the process by which the Court has deferred to state
legislative classifications in some cases, and overturned such classifications in others.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
has been particularly antagonistic toward the "all or nothing" nature of judicial review
under this model. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Professor Gunther has suggested that a "newer equal protec-
tion" is evolving, by which the Court applies what he calls "minimum scrutiny with
bite." See generally Gunther, supra note 126. Under this approach, the Court ostensibly
applies the deferential "mere rationality" standard of review, and yet puts the state to
the task of showing that the legislature actually intended to achieve the legitimate state
interests which are asserted. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
The plurality opinion in Young did not employ this "middle level" standard of
review-Justice Stevens adhered to the "mere rationality" standard of review when he
found that "[tihe record discloses a factual basis for the Common Council's conclusion
that [the Detroit zoning ordinance] will have the desired effect. It is not our function to
appraise the wisdom of its decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than
concentrated in certain areas." 427 U.S. at 71.
132. U.S. v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
133. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
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tion" 134 by means of strict scrutiny analysis. When that analysis is
implemented, it requires that the classification be very closely tailored
to the state objective, that the state's interest be compelling, and that
there be no reasonable, alternative means available which would have
a less onerous impact on fundamental rights. 135
The respondents' equal protection theory in Young, as stated by
the Court, 136 was simply that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment prohibited any content discrimination. That argu-
ment proves too much, however, because" [t]he Constitution does not
require that things different in fact be treated in law as though they
were the same." 137 Even strict scrutiny analysis does not mean that a
state may never intrude upon a fundamental right; it means only that
the state must do so in a manner which shows the utmost deference to
that right. 138 In Young there is a very high degree of congruence
between the classification and its stated objective. The evidence pro-
vided by the city showed that these movie theaters, and not others,
caused legitimate businesses to leave the area, thereby creating a "skid
row." 139 The distinction between adult theaters and other theaters was
entirely appropriate to achieve the city's goal. There was no contention
by the respondents or the dissenting Justices that the classification was
either underinclusive or overinclusive. 14° Given this level of congru-
ence between means and ends, the equal protection analysis should
have been simple. Since" [t]he rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment are recognized as among the most fundamental rights possessed
by a free people,"141 the Detroit ordinance should have been strictly
scrutinized, requiring a compelling state interest and a showing that the
method chosen was the least onerous means available to achieve that
end. Both lower courts did precisely that. The district court found that
"the preservation of neighborhoods, upon which adult establishments
have a destructive impact" was a state interest sufficiently compelling
134. G. GUNTHER, supra note 107, at 595.
135. See American Mini Theatres v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (6th Cir. 1975).
See generally Comment, supra note 126.
136. 427 U.S. at 58.
137. Id. at 668 (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1939)).
138. It is true that few government classifications survive such scrutiny, but it has
been done. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); DeFunis v. Odegaard,
82 Wash.2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
139. 427 U.S. at 55. See Note, 54 TEx. L. REv. 422 n.2 (1976).
140. For a presentation of these concepts, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). As Judge Celebrezze pointed out
when Young was before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, a similar regulation covering
all theaters would probably be impermissibly overinclusive. 518 F.2d at 1025.
141. Id. at 1019.
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to meet the strict standard. 142 Judge Lively, writing for the circuit
court, did not disturb that finding, but found that the city had not met
its burden of showing that this method was the most appropriate means
of promoting that interest. 143 The Supreme Court, however, did not
engage in this analysis. Justice Stevens only mentioned the equal
protection clause when he stated the issue and the holding. 144
All three courts failed to recognize that the equal protection clause
is only secondarily related to content based regulations of protected
expression. Such regulations strike primarily, and most fundamental-
ly, at the free speech guarantee of the first amendment. The govern-
ment has the power to impose "[r]easonable regulations of the time,
place and manner of protected speech," 45 but singling out a particular
message to bear an extra burden is the essence of governmental
censorship, and such censorship strikes at the heart of the first amend-
ment. There are understandable reasons why the courts would over-
look the first amendment issue and use equal protection analysis
instead. The notion of "discrimination" based on content evokes
equal protection concepts simply as a matter of language. Also, the
Supreme Court's use of equal protection analysis in Mosley might
mislead a court into losing sight of the first amendment interests
affected. Finally, it is possible that confusing first amendment and
equal protection issues will not affect the outcome of any particular
case. The test ultimately applied under strict scrutiny requires a
compelling interest to justify the state regulation, no matter how well
the classification is tailored to its goal. The equal protection determina-
tion of compelling interest would possibly be coextensive with the first
amendment determination that a state justification has met the "rigor-
ous constitutional standards'146 it faces when regulating speech.
Nevertheless, the Court in Young had an opportunity to end this
confusion and to state the proper standard in terms of the first amend-
ment. It should have pointed out that of all the content neutrality cases
only Mosley was chiefly an equal protection case; that the Mosley
"opinion speaks chiefly to first amendment values and primarily cites
first amendment cases as authority," 147 and that the Court in Mosley
142. 373 F. Supp. 363, 369 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
143. 518 F.2d at 1020.
144. 427 U.S. at 63, 72-73. Justice Stevens deferred to the judgment of the Detroit
City Council, holding that the zoning ordinance was rationally related to "the city's
interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods." Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 63 n.18.
146. 422 U.S. at 217.
147. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 27 (1975).
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acknowledged that "the equal protection claim in this case is closely
intertwined with First Amendment interests." '148 The Court should
have stated that the threshold inquiry with regard to a content dis-
criminatory regulation is whether there is a state justification substan-
tial enough to satisfy the requirements of the first amendment. Then,
and only then, should the classification be subjected to equal protec-
tion analysis. It is understandable that a court faced with a clear equal
protection violation might never reach the first amendment inquiry, 149
but it must be recognized conceptually that the first amendment inquiry
is the initial one. 150
C. The Plurality: Part 1lT
Having passed up the opportunity to clarify the relationship be-
tween the first amendment and the equal protection clause, Justice
Stevens went on to establish why "there is surely a less vital interest in
the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of
ideas of social and political significance." 151 It is in Part I of the
opinion that Justice Stevens purported to show that the admittedly
protected expression of the Pussycat Theatres was not what Voltaire
had in mind. 152
It is important to analyze the authority offered by Justice Stevens,
especially since the dissenting opinions did not do so. 153 The first
group of cases Stevens discussed dealt with unprotected speech. 154
These cases, dealing with speech which incites to crime, and the
"fighting comment," 15 5 are irrelevant to the inquiry in Young, since
148. 408 U.S. at 95.
149. For example, the justification offered by the City of Jacksonville in Erznoznik,
that the ordinance protected minors, failed because a majority of the Court found the
classification was clearly overinclusive since it included innocent nudity such as "baby's
buttocks." 422 U.S. at 213.
150. It should be noted that the respondents did not make this mistake. They clearly
stated that the Detroit content regulation violated the "First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments," Brief for Respondents American Mini Theatres, Inc., and Pussycat Theatres of
Michigan, Inc., at 65, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and that the
regulations were "Violative Of The First Amendment . . . And Repugnant To The
Equal Protection Clause." Brief for Respondent Nortown Theatre, Inc. at 40, Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Justice Stevens, however, framed the
issue solely in equal protection terms. 427 U.S. at 58, 63.
151. 427 U.S. at 61.
152. Id. at 70. See note I supra.
153. Justice Stewart, responding to Part III, chiefly refuted the ability of the govern-
ment to distinguish sexual materials without a determination of obscenity. Id. at 87.
Justice Blackmun addressed only the issue of vagueness. Id. at 88.
154. See notes 38-40 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 38-40 supra.
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the movies at issue were admittedly protected expression. 156 No analo-
gy is drawn from these cases; they are simply offered as examples of a
proper governmental content distinction affecting speech. But until the
Court holds that all speech falls within the protection of the first
amendment, defining that which does not must inevitably require a
look to its content. Such cases say nothing about whether, once
protection is granted, it may be removed or restricted solely because of
the content of the expression.
Justice Stevens then offered further examples ostensibly within the
area of protected speech where content neutrality was not required.
Some of these examples, however, were cases dealing not with pro-
tected speech, but with unprotected speech granted limited protection
in order to prevent a chilling of first amendment rights. Libel has never
been subject to first amendment protection, and the newspaper cases
cited by Justice Stevens merely afford some protection to libelous (and
therefore unprotected) speech to prevent that chilling effect. 157
Likewise, deceptive or false speech is not protected speech, and
Justice Stevens' references to commercial speech seriously misused
the Court's recent decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.158 In that case, Justice Black-
mun was careful to point out that prohibitions on false or misleading
advertising were valid because "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or
otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake."' 159 Otherwise,
Virginia State Board put an end to the notion that commercial speech
was to receive different protection than other speech. 160 Thus, the
statement by Justice Stevens that that case "held that the First Amend-
ment affords some protection to commercial speech" is unduly mis-
leading. 161 After Virginia State Board, examining the content of
commercial speech, like examining allegedly obscene speech, is for
the purpose of determining whether that speech is within the protection
of the first amendment at all.
Similarly, the limits on the statements of an employer during a
labor dispute cannot accurately be described as content regulation of
protected speech. Employers are forbidden to make statements which
156. 427 U.S. at 85 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
157. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
158. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159. Id. at 771.
160. The Court stated that the "purely economic" interest of the advertiser "hardly
disqualifies him from protection under the First Amendment." Id. at 762.
161. 427 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added).
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contain a "threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 162 A
threat or a promise is an act, albeit a communicative act, which is
essentially analogous to incitation to crime. Words are often the means
of performing acts which are censured by the government; such verbal
acts are subject to penalties not only in labor disputes, but also in other
areas Justice Stevens did not mention. Words may comprise the tort of
assault, 163 or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 164 In the law
of contracts, if words induce reasonable reliance in another, the speak-
er incurs liability. The plurality failed to recognize that the law often
penalizes the result brought about by a communication. The law
proscribes the threat, the assault, the deceit-it could even proscribe
causing the ruin of a neighborhood-without implicating first amend-
ment concerns. However, when the government "punishes only spo-
ken words," ' 165 it violates the first amendment.
Two of the cases Justice Stevens cited, however, did approve
content based regulations of protected speech. Government prohibi-
tions on the sale of obscene materials to minors are valid though such
materials admittedly are not obscene for adults. 166 The special treat-
ment of juveniles under the first amendment has long been recognized
as a unique exception, due to the presumed inability of the juvenile
mind to choose objectively in the marketplace of ideas. 167 Justice
Stewart's dissent in Young specifically excepted communication to
juvenile audiences from his absolute position of content neutrality. 168
Justice Stevens offered no explanation why this narrow exception
would make the rule of content neutrality inapplicable in Young.
The other example of a discriminatory content regulation proffered
by Justice Stevens, and recognized as an exception by Justice Stewart
in his dissent, 169 was Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights. 170 Lehman,
like Young, was a 4-1-4 opinion, but it has been cited almost
exclusively for the theory of Justice Douglas' concurring opinion. 171
162. Id. at 68-69 n.31 (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969)).
163. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 40 (4th ed. 1971).
164. Id. at 56.
165. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
166. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
167. The Michigan Supreme Court banned the showing of erotic drive-in movies (on
facts quite similar to those in Erznoznik) because "the moving pictures shown were not
fit to be seen by children below 18 years of age." Bloss v. Paris Township, 380 Mich.
466, 469, 157 N.W.2d 260, 261 (1968).
168. 427 U.S. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
171. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Orazio
v. Town of North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Justice Douglas maintained that a municipality could shield the captive
audience on its rapid transit cars from the intrusion of political adver-
tising.172 Again, Justice Stevens made no effort to analogize this
precedent to the facts in Young, nor did he urge that this exception
justifies an exception in Young. Rather, these two exceptions and the
other inapposite cases were cited, apparently to show that the rule of
content neutrality does not truly exist. Justice Stevens seemed to
reason that because content distinctions are made so often, they surely
can be made when "few of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve"' 173 the speech in question. Such was the case, he
maintained, in Young.
This analysis creates a new class of less protected speech ecompas-
sing erotic materials. Erotic materials may be found obscene, and, if
so, they may be banned without implicating the first amendment. If not
obscene, they will be free from "total suppression," but such mate-
rials may be regulated solely on the basis of content if they are "erotic
materials that have some arguably artistic value." 174 This must be
taken as the plurality's first amendment standard; any equal protection
or due process problems are solved if there is "a factual basis for the
• . . conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired
effect." 17
5
The insensitivity in Part II of Young to some of the most funda-
mental assumptions about freedom of expression is unsettling. Even
though these movies were admittedly protected by the first amend-
ment, Justice Stevens categorized them as outside the realm of "ideas
of social and political significance.' ' 76 Neither the philosophy of
freedom of expression nor prior Supreme Court decisions lend the
slightest credence to such a narrow view of what the Constitution
protects. Forgotten, or at least ignored, was Justice Holmes' warning
that "we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with
death." 177
The inference in the plurality opinion is that erotic expression is
simply not an "opinion" or an "idea" within the meaning of Justice
Holmes' statement. Such a distinction is often made to justify the
exclusion of obscenity from first amendment protection; the argument
172. 418 U.S. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
173. 427 U.S. at 70.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 71.
176. Id. at 61.
177. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Accord, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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is that obscenity appeals not to the mind, but to the "elemental
passions." 178 Justice Rehnquist made a similar argument in his dissent
in Virginia State Board,179 describing most commercial speech as
having "no ideological content. ' 180 Whatever the validity of this
distinction in determining the protection or lack of protection for erotic
and commercial speech, 181 the force of the argument greatly di-
minishes when it has been determined that the speech at issue is
protected. As the late Justice Harlan wrote, once the expression is
deemed protected, it must be recognized that
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function. . . . In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction
the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cogni-
tive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often
be the more important element of the overall message to be
communicated. 182
Justice Harlan's position is in keeping with the traditional view that
protected speech, besides simply relating an ideology, has among its
purposes "to convince, to induce desired behavior in another, to
describe, to direct, to entertain or amuse, to. investigate, analyze or
plan." 8 3 The plurality offers no reason beyond ipse dixit why Voltaire
(or the Constitution) would take a narrower view.
There is little doubt that prior to Young the Supreme Court af-
forded films the same protection as any other form of expression. 184 In
Part I of Young, however,
[t]he plurality's suggestion that the degree of First Amend-
ment protection depends upon our willingness to "march our
sons and daughters off to war" is the equivalent of subjec-
ting First Amendment rights to a popular vote. There is
hardly a case in which this Court has struck down govern-
mental attempts to suppress First Amendment rights in
which the Court could not have found the citizenry largely
178. Clor, Obscenity and the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
207, 211 (1974).
179. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
180. Id. at 790.
181. See generally Finnis, "Reason and Passion:" The Constitutional Dialectic of
Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1967).
182. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
183. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 6 (1976).
184. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It is interesting to note that in Young Justice Stevens
quoted from Mosley saying the government must be neutral not only as to message and
ideas, but also as to "subject matter" and "content." 427 U.S. at 64 (quoting Police
Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95). Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Stevens' opinion in
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unwilling to fight for what the speaker had to say. Indeed, it
is obvious that the protection of the First Amendment is
needed only in those instances in which the subject matter of
speech is offensive to the community at large.1 8
5
The benefit of free thought and discussion in all areas, and upon all
subjects, enriches society as a whole, not simply isolated individu-
als. 186 It is wrong to suppress expression thought to be false or evil
because we can never be certain it is false (unless we claim infallibili-
ty), 187 and also because even false ideas are needed to challenge the
true belief lest the latter become "a dead dogma, not a living truth."188
A society committed to freedom of expression cannot support the
plurality rule in Young. The first amendment should mean that the
majority may not impose upon the minority the type of value judg-
ments underlying the plurality opinion. The conclusion reached by the
plurality is particularly dangerous to free expression because it allows
a majority of the Court to remove from first amendment protection
speech which they do not find socially or politically "significant."
When the life tenured bench can determine the bounds of free expres-
sion by means of such a highly subjective standard, there is truly "no
readily ascertainable general principle for stopping short" 8 9 of gov-
ernment censorship of unpopular ideas.
IV. CONTENT NEUTRALITY AND ZONING
Since joining the Court in 1971, Justice Powell has been recog-
nized for his ability to view cases before the Court in different, and
Young, yet he used this very language in his dissent in Erznoznik to support the
proposition that the Jacksonville ordinance, while "regulating the content of a certain
type of display, .... is not a restriction of any 'message,' "and is therefore proper. 422
U.S. at 223.
185. Respondents' Petition for Rehearing at 2, Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
186. One hundred and twenty years ago, a great proponent of freedom of expression
encountered a similar attitude regarding religious freedom in a British official who felt
that religious toleration
"meant complete liberty to all freedom of worship, among Christians, who
worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant toleration of all sects and
denominations of Christians. ... Idesire to call attention to the fact that a
man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this
country. . . , maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity
of Christ are beyond the pale of [religious] toleration. Who, after this imbecile
display, can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed
away. ...
J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 122 n. I (E. P.
Dutton ed. 1951).
187. See id. at 104-05.
188. Id. at 126. Virtue which is never tempted is weak indeed. See S. CLEMENS, The
Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg, in THE MAN THAT CORRUPTED HADLEYBURG AND
OTHER STORIES AND ESSAYS (1902).
189. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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usually insightful terms. Somewhat in emulation of Justice Harlan,
Justice Powell's separate opinions often clarify or limit the opinion of
the Court, or offer an alternative theory for decision. 190 His concurring
opinion in Young, immediately following Part III of the plurality
opinion, would appear to fit admirably into this category. However,
the problems with his analysis 191 are so severe that the memory of
Justice Harlan is evoked in form only.
The concurring opinion began by describing Young ofs a case of
first impression in which the Court could not "mechanically apply the
doctrines developed in other contexts." 1 92 The effect of the opinion,
however, was to mechanically apply the test developed in United
States v. O'Brien,193 which was admittedly out of context. 194 The
substantial "factual distinctions" between O'Brien and Young, which
Justice Powell purported to recognize and then ignored, made the
O'Brien test inapplicable. In O'Brien, the destruction of a Selective
Service registration card was, in the words of Chief Justice Warren,
"conduct having no connection with speech. . . . [T]here is nothing
necessarily expressive about such conduct." 195 The Court observed
that the government imposed sanctions for wilfully destroying registra-
tion cards solely to prevent harm "to the smooth and efficient func-
tioning of the Selective Service System." 196 Chief Justice Warren
pointed out that "[t]he case at bar is therefore unlike one where the
alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some
measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct
is itself thought to be harmful."1 97
The activity in Young, however, did not combine speech and
nonspeech elements. The regulated movies in Young were "pure"
speech, if that term has any meaning at all; O'Brien was convicted
solely for the "noncommunicative impact of his conduct." 198 Because
of the dual nature of O'Brien's conduct, unlike the conduct of the
respondents in Young, the government's regulation of conduct inci-
dentally infringed speech. Essentially, the O'Brien test is intended to
190. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (concurring opinion); Apoda-
ca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (concurring opinion). See generally Gunther, In Search
of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Mr. Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 1001 (1972).
191. See notes 52-76 supra and accompanying text.
192. 427 U.S. at 76.
193. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
194. 427 U.S. at 80.
195. 391 U.S. at 375.
196. Id. at 382.
197. Id.
198. Id.
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
allow such incidental infringements upon speech if they are made in
good faith and in the most limited manner possible. 199 The Detroit
ordinance was narrowly tailored to its objective, 2°° and, according to
Justice Powell, was not intended to suppress the speech itself but rather
to remedy the effect of the films on the neighborhoods. 2°' In this way,
the O'Brien test was easily met.
A key problem, however, is Justice Powell's determination that the
infringement on speech in Young is incidental because the ordinance
does not upset the free flow of protected speech from the creator to the
consuming public. Apparently borrowing from the labor law concept
of alternative channels of communication, 20 2 Justice Powell asserted
that there was no significant harm to first amendment rights as long as
the movies would still be produced and the public had alternative
means of viewing them.2 3 From this proposition one must conclude
that the guarantees of the first amendment inhere not in persons but in
the speech itself (or only in the original creators of the speech). It
requires no extension of this concept to reason that if the government
prohibited the passing of handbills urging a particular philosophy on a
given street corner, while permitting the passing of handbills espous-
ing the opposite viewpoint, then the restriction on first amendment
rights would be only "incidental" as long as there exist alternative
means of conveying the message contained in the prohibited hand
bills. This focus on the free flow of speech rather than on the rights of
the individual theater owners to display movies of their choice, was
implicitly rejected by Justice Powell himself in Erznoznik: he rec-
ognized that the "issue here, however, is not the viewing rights of
unwilling viewers but rather the rights of those who operate drive-in
theaters and the public that attends these establishments.' 201 Indeed,
the biggest analytical hurdle for Justice Powell was the need to recon-
cile his concurrence in Young with his opinion in Erznoznik. His terse
reply to Justice Stewart's statement that Erznoznik is "almost on 'all
fours' with this case" 20 5 was that "[it involves nothing of the
kind.' '206
199. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
200. See notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
201. 427 U.S. at 80-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
202. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
203. 427 U.S. at 78-79. This notion finds some extrajudicial support from Alexander
Meiklejohn: "What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948).
204. 422 U.S. at 211 n.7 (emphasis added).
205. 427 U.S. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The respondent in Erznoznik offered three justifications for the
Jacksonville ordinance. It was Justice Powell's treatment of the first-
that the huge display of nude parts of the body viewable from the street
was a nuisance to unwilling passers-by-that created the taut parallel
to Young. The second justification, protection of juveniles, and the
third, prevention of traffic accidents, were found overinclusive and
underinclusive respectively. 20 7 Justice Powell's statement in Young
that the Court in Erznoznik had rejected the "first purpose [because]
the ordinance was overbroad" 20 is simply inaccurate. 201 The portion
of the opinion in Erznoznik dealing with nuisance does not speak to
overbreadth at all, but rather to the ability of the government, consis-
tent with the first amendment, to make content distinctions in regula-
ting protected speech. Justice Powell concluded that: "[The limited
privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this
censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its
content."210
Justice Powell undoubtedly felt the need to distinguish Erznoznik
since its facts appear to fit his Young analysis perfectly. The restric-
tion in Erznoznik was not total; it was (as he said in Young) a
"decision. . .to treat certain movie theaters differently because they
have markedly different effects upon their surroundings. "211 The Jack-
sonville ordinance required that certain theaters not locate in a particu-
lar place in order to avoid a certain tangible effect, i.e., a nuisance.
The Detroit ordinance sought to prevent skid rows. Surely Justice
Powell would not suggest that regulating speech because it is a nui-
sance evinces an intention to suppress free expression based on disa-
greement with its message. The Court has long recognized the states'
ability to curtail expression which constitutes a nuisance,212 just asit
has allowed zoning ordinances. 213 The City of Jacksonville did not
attempt to restrict movies containing nudity where it did not create a
207. See note 100 supra.
208. 427 U.S. at 83 (Powell, J., concurring).
209. Overbreadth was the infirmity of the second justification, not the first. "In this
case, assuming the ordinance is aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing the films, the
restriction is broader than permissible." 422 U.S. at 213.
210. Id. at 212. Justice White, dissenting in Erznoznik, recognized clearly that the
nuisance section (Part I1-A) was not decided on the same basis as the juvenile section
(Part 11-B) and observed that "[i]f, as the Court holds in Part II-B of its opinion, that the
ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad even as an exercise of the police power to
protect children, it is fatally overbroad as to the population generally. Part II-A is
surplusage." Id. at 224 (White, J., dissenting).
211. 427 U.S. at 82 n.6.
212. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971)).
213. See notes 217-31 infra and accompanying text.
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nuisance, so there was no apparent intent to suppress expression. The
ordinance in Young was similarly tailored to its specific objective. It
cannot be said that the ordinance in Erznoznik significantly limited the
content choices of the makers of the films, or the audiences who
wished to view them. Thus, first amendment rights were affected only
incidentally.
In Erznoznik, however, Justice Powell showed scrupulous regard
for the rights of the Jacksonville drive-in owners and the added mone-
tary burden they faced in complying with the statute.214 When counsel
for American Mini Theatres argued that their client would bear added
costs in relocating, Justice Powell replied that "[t]he inquiry for First
Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact; rather it
looks only to the effect of this ordinance upon freedom of expres-
sion." 215 The point overlooked is that in terms of the impact on the
free flow of expression, the two ordinances are identical. In sum, the
first amendment infringement of the Jacksonville ordinance was just as
"incidental" and "wholly unrelated to the suppression of any free
expression"2 16 as was the Detroit ordinance. Both of these laws re-
stricted the freedom of expression having a specific content; the
decisions are irreconcilable unless the state has a constitutionally
recognized higher interest in effecting its zoning laws than its nuisance
laws.
It is significant, therefore, that Justice Powell's opinion begins
with a general view of the way in which the Court has "broadly
sustained the zoning power of local municipalities. 217 The power of
municipalities to pass innovative laws regulating land use has grown
enormously in the years since it was first upheld in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 218 As Justice Sutherland then stated, such laws
"must find their justification in some aspect of the police power,
asserted for the public welfare.' '219 Today, the definition of the police
power invariably used in zoning cases is the one provided by Justice
Douglas: "The concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive ...
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
214. 422 U.S. at 211 n.7, 211-12 n.8.
215. 427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
216. Id. at 80-81.
217. Id. at 73.
218. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
219. Id. at 387. The relatively modest Euclid ordinance zoned according to the height
of buildings and the general use (commercial or residential) of the property. In fact, to
the extent that zoning following Euclid tried to concentrate particular uses in defined
zones, the Young ordinance should be called anti-zoning-trying to disperse a zone of
adult theatres.
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that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy .. ."220
Employing such broad language, courts have permitted zoning that
prohibits certain architectural designs 221 simply because the designs
were "at variance" with the surrounding homes. 222 In People v.
Stover,223 the Supreme Court refused to disturb a New York Court of
Appeals decision upholding a zoning ordinance of the City of Rye,
New York, regulating where property owners could hang their clothes-
lines. The Supreme Court also upheld the zoning ordinance in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas224 which provided that only people of the
same family could share a house. 225 Clearly, the desire of the City of
Detroit to eliminate skid rows, whether for reasons of economics or
aesthetics, was within the broad scope of the police power. However,
establishing the constitutional power of municipalities to enact such
laws without violating the fifth amendment 226 does not end the inquiry
when the means chosen are offensive to the first amendment.
Both Belle Terre and Stover upheld zoning ordinances in the face
of first amendment challenges. In Belle Terre, unrelated persons
wishing to live together brought a freedom of association claim which
was rejected by the Court. However, Justice Douglas denied that there
actually was a first amendment interest being infringed. He stated that
the ordinance "involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as. . . the right of association.'"227 The ordinance
was not upheld despite a first amendment infringement, as Justice
Powell suggested in Young, but because there was no such infringe-
ment.221 Stover presented the classic O'Brien situation in which the
proscription of noncommunicative conduct (hanging a clothesline)
necessarily infringed communicative conduct (protesting taxes).229
220. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1955) (citation omitted).
221. Reid v. Architectural Bd., 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
222. State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271, 69
N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
223. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
224. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
225. The ordinance provided that not more than two persons unrelated by blood or
marriage could live together. Id. at 2.
226. "[Pjrivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
227. 416 U.S. at 7.
228. Justice Douglas reasoned that the right of unmarried people to live together was
not infringed, since two unmarried people could do so without violating the ordinance.
Any other association was permissible because the family cduld "entertain whomever it
likes." Id. at 8-9. This reasoning is rather conclusory, but it seems that Justice Douglas'
main concern was to reaffirm the Court's two-tiered approach to equal protection
analysis in the face of the lower court's attempt to use an intermediate standard between
"rational relationship" and "strict scrutiny." See Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle
Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MicH. L. REV. 508 (1974); note 131 supra.
229. The Stover case posed a potential complication. The clothesline protest against
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Neither of these cases provides a basis for imbuing zoning ordi-
nances with any magical quality in comparison with any other legiti-
mate legislative function. Justice Powell quoted Justice Marshall's
dissent in Belle Terre to establish that zoning may be "the most
essential function performed by local government," 230 but neglected to
continue, as did Justice Marshall, that "deference does not mean
abdication. This Court has an obligation to ensure that zoning ordi-
nances, even when adopted in furtherance of such legitimate aims, do
not infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights."231
Historically, expression which constituted "a public nuisance in
that privacy interests were being invaded" 232 has been recognized by
the Court as one of the "narrowly limited classes of speech ' 2 33 which
can be regulated by the states. 234 The major deleterious effect Detroit
sought to remedy was the deterioration of neighborhoods that results
when surrounding residents and other businesses, offended by adult
films and their patrons, respond by moving out. Stated in these terms,
the interest the city tried to protect with the zoning ordinance in Young
is very similar to that which Jacksonville sought to protect in Erz-
noznik.235
Justice Powell's analysis makes it clear that Jacksonville could
have passed an amendment to its zoning ordinance to prohibit drive-in
movies displaying "Specified Sexual Activities" from locating where
the screen was visible from the street. Under the concurring opinion in
Young, the content distinction which failed to be justified by privacy
interests would thereby be justified by that essential function called
zoning. The difference between the two cases, using Justice Powell's
own analysis, is pure taxonomy. The Jacksonville ordinance was
"misconceived" 2 36 only in that it lacked the proper label. Such dis-
tinctions are not worthy of differing constitutional interpretations,
especially when made by the same author only a year apart. Justice
Powell's conclusory and unprecedented finding of an "incidental"
unreasonable city tax rates had been underway for years, and it appeared that the zoning
law was passed in response to the Stovers' protest. Even Justice Powell would perhaps
find such action was "using the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression."
427 U.S. at 84 (Powell, J., concurring).
230. 427 U.S. at 80 (quoting Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974)).
231. 416 U.S. at 14.
232. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
233. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972).
234. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
235. Cf. Brief for Respondent Nortown Theatre, Inc., at 56-57, Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (both cases involve "pitting the First Amendment
rights of speakers against the privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or
auditors").
236. 427 U.S. at 84 (Powell, J., concurring).
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restriction on first amendment rights, and his inapposite use of the
O'Brien test, permitted the precise result in Young which he claimed
he was "not inclined to agree with;" that is, "that nonobscene, erotic
materials may be treated differently under First Amendment principles
from other forms of protected expression.'"237
V. REFLECrIONS ON THE IMPACT OF YOUNG
As mentioned above, many cities are in the process of imitating
Detroit's ordinance regulating urban pornography. Many problems,
including violent crime, have arisen in cities such as Boston that have
employed the opposite approach of concentrating such establishments
in a single "combat zone." This makes the Detroit technique even
more attractive.238 The decision in Young was certainly reassuring for
officials in those cities considering the problem, but the case suggests
that overzealous attempts to zone out pornography may be struck
down. Part I of Justice Stevens' opinion acknowledged, perhaps
grudgingly, that "the First Amendment will not tolerate the total
suppression of erotic materials.''239 A city might overstep these
bounds if the practical effect of the ordinance was total, or near total,
suppression, whatever its motivation. Justice Stevens, in a footnote,
stressed the importance of the district court's finding that numerous
other locations were available to the respondents, indicating that the
"situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of
suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech. "24 Justice
Powell also warned against using zoning as a pretext for regulating
speech in an attempt to eliminate pornography. 24 1 The practical impact
of Young is that cities must avoid being too effective in curtailing skid
rows through zoning ordinances regulating adult movie theaters; they
must stop short of totally eliminating these movies. 242
Despite the magnitude and celerity of the practical impact of
Young, it is doubtful that the impact within the legal profession and
237. Id. at 73 n.1.
238. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, § 1, at 1. col. I.
239. 427 U.S. at 70.
240. Id. at 71 n.35.
241. Id. at 84 (Powell, I., concurring). Public statements by city officials describing
zoning as a weapon against pornography could perhaps be used as evidence to show
zoning was a mere pretext. See N.Y. Times, supra note 238.
242. It should be noted that the recurring theme in both the plurality and the concur-
ring opinions-that less than total suppression is not as constitutionally suspect as total
suppression-has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court. As recently as 1975,
the Court reaffirmed that: "One is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975) (quoting Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)). As Justice Black explained:
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upon future constitutional adjudication will be equally significant. It is
difficult to conceive of a lower court judge workably applying the
plurality's "marching our sons and daughters" test to future cases.
The plurality's concept of a middle level of "less protected" speech
could be used by prosecuters in obscenity cases as an alternative
argument; they could rely upon Young and assert that, even if not
obscene, such erotic speech may be subject to more stringent, content-
based regulation than other speech. Lower courts, however, are not
bound to apply Part III of Justice Stevens' opinion, since it did not
garner five votes. In addition, state courts have shown a recent tenden-
cy to use the state constitution to provide broader safeguards for
individual rights than are afforded by the federal constitution under
recent Supreme Court decisions. 243
For these reasons, it is the ostensibly more sophisticated reasoning
of Justice Powell which is more likely to have a lasting effect. 244 The
severe infirmities of the concurring opinion are not nearly so glaring as
those of the plurality. Justice Powell's reasoning is also not as novel as
that of the plurality, having been shared by Judge Celebrezze (in
dissent) when Young was before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 245
The danger of Justice Powell's opinion is that his reasoning is less
This reason for abridgement strikes me as being on a par with holding that
governmental suppression of a newspaper in a city would not violate the First
Amendment because there continue to be radio and television stations. First
Amendment freedoms can no more validly be taken away by degrees than by
one fell swoop.
NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 80 (1964) (concurring opinion). In
addition, the respondents in Young pointed out numerous other cases, e.g., Interstate
Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968), Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974), where regulations or penalties were found to be violative of first
amendment freedoms. Brief for Respondents American Mini Theatres, at 67-73, Young
v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
243. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). A recent Massachusetts obscenity case passed up
the opportunity to make any use of Young. The Supreme Judicial Court applied a
rational relationship equal protection test to the obscene speech. The court implied that
nonobscene, erotic speech is protected and that the court would limit obscenity statutes
burdening protected speech. Commonwealth v. 707 Main Corp.,-Mass.-, 357 N.E.2d
753, 758 (1976).
244. In a sharply divided decision a single concurrence can later become the law of
the case. Justice Douglas' opinion in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights is a prime
example, establishing the captive audience exception to the doctrine of content neu-
trality. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (concurring opinion). Another recent example is Justice
Blackmun's concurrence in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See,
e.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976), and Usery v. Bettendorf
Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
245. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1021 (1975) (dissenting
opinion). Judge Celebrezze's dissent was described by one commentator as "persua-
sive," see Note, 54 TEXAS L. REV. 422,428 n.35, but his opinion applied the O'Brien test
without ever explaining why the infringement was incidental. However, Judge Celebrez-
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limited than that of Justice Stevens which, by its terms, deals only with
"erotic" materials. Justice Powell's opinion allows content neutrality
to be abandoned and permits less than total restrictions on any speech
causing undesirable effects. The state interest will be deemed substan-
tial as long as the zoning label applies. 246
The Court recently delivered a unanimous opinion in Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro247 which indicates that
perhaps neither the reasoning of Justice Powell nor the reasoning of the
plurality will have much vitality in analogous cases. The Willingboro
ordinance struck down by the Court banned the posting of "for sale"
and "sold" signs by homeowners for the stated purpose of stemming
white flight from the community.24 8 Although the ordinance clearly
discriminated on the basis of content, there were other means to
communicate the same message, such as newspapers and real estate
listings. One would have expected Justice Powell to find that these
alternative channels of communication rendered the infringement on
speech incidental since the "free access of the public to the expres-
sion" 249 was not substantially reduced.
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Marshall, however,
extended the principle of content neutrality to commercial speech, and
made no use of Justice Powell's analysis in Young.25° The Linmark
opinion dealt with the decisions in Young, O'Brien, Erznoznik, and
Mosley in a single paragraph. 251 Citing to a footnote in the opinion of
the plurality in Young, Justice Marshall evidently read the case to
allow content regulation where "the place or manner of the speech
produces a detrimental 'secondary effect' on society.''252 Apparently
distinguishing between a focus on the expression and a focus on the
theaters, the flight of whites due to the "for sale" signs in Linmark
was somehow a "primary" effect, 53 while in Young the flight of
ze did have the advantage over Justice Powell of not having authored the opinion in
Erznoznik.
246. It seems that if Young is applied in the future as a zoning case, then the effect of
the Bernan-Belle Terre-Young line of cases will be to give cities nearly plenary power to
zone out their troubles.
247. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
248. Id. at 87-88.
249. 427 U.S. at 73 (Powell, J., concurring).
250. The opinion dealt only in passing with Young, despite the fact that an incidental
restriction analysis similar to Justice Powell's Young concurrence was an alternate basis
for the holding of the Third Circuit below. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 794-98 (1976). The statement of Judge Gibbons, in dissent
below, applies with equal force to Young: "In this case, the shackle upon speech can
hardly be dignified as 'incidental.'" Id. at 813.
251. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
252. Id. at 94 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34).
253. Id.
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legitimate businesses from the Detroit neighborhoods due to the adult
movies was a "secondary" effect 254 of the speech.
While there is some solace in the fact that the Linmark opinion did
not cite Young for the plurality's principle of less protection for erotic
speech, or for the concurring opinion's misreading of incidental re-
strictions, the potential consequences of the primary/secondary distinc-
tion are dizzying. A city will surely have no difficulty in finding some
attenuated damage to society which can be labeled a "secondary"
effect. Why a city should have less power under the first amendment to
prevent immediate damage than to prevent subsequent damage caused
by free expression is a mystery unexplained by the single paragraph in
Linmark or the footnote in Young, especially when the means of
preventing that damage is the same-the direct regulation of the
content of the speech itself. Certainly this primary/secondary interpre-
tation of Young could not be applied in a principled fashion in a later
case without further explication and justification.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the plurality and concurring opinions has
proceeded with the conviction that
[t]o disagree with the decisions of the Nixon Court merely
because they are conservative instead of liberal is like pre-
ferring chocolate to vanilla. More than taste is at issue,
however, when evaluating Court opinions. Appellate courts,
especially the Supreme Court, are unique because they are
the only branch of government obligated to explain what
they are doing and why. An opinion representing the views
of the highest court must be persuasive in order to merit
respect. The quality of reasoning in an opinion measures its
result3 55
It must be concluded that under these standards Young v. American
Mini Theatres is a jurisprudential mess. Part II of Justice Stevens'
opinion demonstrates that "men can[not] have satisfactory relations
with each other until they have agreed on certain ultimata of belief ,26
because the plurality opinion undermines some of the most basic
precepts underlying the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion. The first amendment has been read to protect all speech, includ-
ing that which only a "few of us" would deem worthy of protection.
254. The Young footnote, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34, asserted that the Detroit ordinance
was directed at the secondary effect-deterioriation of the community and the spawning
of crime-rather than the dissemination of offensive speech.
255. L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xi
(1974).
256. Holmes, The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table in THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN
LITERATURE 821 (S. Bradley, R. Beatty, E. Long, eds. 1967).
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First amendment law prior to Young has scrupulously prevented deci-
sions requiring nonelected members of the judiciary to define "im-
portant" expression.
The woefully inadequate opinion in Young can be explained, but
not justified, simply by the Justices' distaste for this particular expres-
sion. This attitude is evidenced by the comment in the Chief Justice's
dissent in Erznoznik: "The First Amendment interests involved in this
case are trivial at best.' "57 This attitude best explains the seemingly
inconsistent votes of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in
Hudgens and Young. 8 The reasoning of the two cases is flatly
contradictory. Only the result-a denial of first amendment claims-is
consistent. It has been said that Justice Stevens "assigns varying
degrees of importance to different forms of expression,"29 and that he
"gives short shrift to private interests he considers of small mag-
nitude. '"260 Part III of Young makes those statements prophetic
indeed.
In addition to this insensitivity toward freedom of expression is the
disappointing and uncritical deference to municipal zoning laws re-
flected in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell. Repeating ad
infinitum that the Detroit ordinance is but an incidental restriction on
first amendment rights will not make it so. Justice Powell's attempt to
distinguish Erznoznik falls pathetically short, and is further weakened
by the fact that he authored that opinion.
What these opinions demonstrate is an unwillingness to impose any
burden upon society to guarantee freedom for all. Free expression is
not without cost. Recognition of this fact does not preclude regulation;
there is a necessary trade-off between the costs and benefits of free
speech, but the balance which may be struck is limited by the preexist-
ing bias toward freedom of expression embodied in the first amend-
ment. At present, this society is manifesting an increasing intolerance
for erotic expression. Magazine publishers, and even actors and actres-
ses, are being prosecuted under local obscenity laws. 261 "In our
257. 422 U.S. 205, 223 (1975). Justice Rehnquist took a similar view in his dissent in
Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 790 ("the
[first amendment] rights of the appellees seem to me to be marginal at best"). For a
sobering analysis of the jurisprudence of Justice Rehnquist, see Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
258. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
259. The One Hundred and First Justice: An Analysis of the Opinions of Justice John
Paul Stevens, Sitting as Judge on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 29 VAND. L. REV.
125, 144 (1976).
260. Id. at 195.
261. Time Magazine, Feb. 21, 1977, at 51, col. 2.
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country we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of
speech, freedom of conscience, and the prudence never to practice
either." 262 In prior days, the Supreme Court was the chief protector of
the imprudent among us.
The Court renounced that role in Young, and failed to provide a
principled justification for its decision. The Court will not regain that
role unless it views laws such as Detroit's anti-skid row ordinance with
deep suspicion, and requires a compelling societal interest when the
government seeks to restrict protected expression solely on the basis of
its content.
KEVIN D. MCDONALD
262. The Civil Liberties Review 3:5, at 74 (1976-77) (quoting Samuel Clemens).
